Do Humans Imitate Robots? An Investigation of Strategic Social Learning in Human-Robot Interaction
参考中译:人类会模仿机器人吗？人-机器人交互中的策略性社会学习研究


     

作者：Debora Zanatto（School of Computer Science, University of Plymouth）
Massimiliano Patacchiola（School of Computer Science, University of Plymouth）
Jeremy Goslin（School of Psychology, University of Plymouth）
Serge Thill（Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour Radboud University Nijmegen）
Angelo Cangelosi（Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester）
会议名：15th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI 2020)
会议日期：23-26 March 2020
会议地点：Cambridge, United Kingdom
出版年：2020
页码：449-457
总页数：9
馆藏号：341077
分类号：TP242-53/I59/(15th)
关键词：Imitation；Social learning；Human-Robot interaction；Strategy；Investment game
参考中译：模仿；社会学习；人机交互；策略；投资博弈
语种：eng
文摘：Theories on social learning indicate that imitative choices are usually performed whenever copying the others' behaviour has no additional cost. Here, we extended such investigations of social learning to Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). Participants played the Economic Investment Game with a robot banker while observing another robot player also investing in the robot banker. By manipulating the robot banker payoff, three conditions of unfairness were created: (1) unfair payoff for the participants, (2) unfair payoff for the robot player and (3) unfair payoff for both. Results showed that when the payoff was low for the participants and high for the robot player, participants invested more money in the robot banker than when both parties received a low return. Also, for this specific condition, participants' investments increased further with a more interactive robot player (defined as demonstrating increased attention, congruent movements and speech) This suggests that social and cognitive human competencies can be used and transposed to non-human agents. Further, imitation can potentially be extended to HRI, with interactivity likely having a key role in increasing this effect.
参考中译：关于社会学习的理论表明，当模仿他人的行为没有额外成本时，模仿选择通常会被执行。在这里，我们将这种关于社会学习的研究扩展到人-机器人交互(HRI)。参与者与一名机器人银行家玩经济投资游戏，同时观察另一名机器人玩家也在投资这名机器人银行家。通过操纵机器人银行家的收益，创造了三种不公平的条件：(1)参与者的不公平收益，(2)机器人玩家的不公平收益，(3)两者的不公平收益。结果表明，当参与者的回报较低，而机器人玩家的回报较高时，参与者在机器人银行家身上投入的资金比双方都获得较低回报时更多。此外，对于这一特定情况，参与者的投资随着更具互动性的机器人玩家(定义为展示更多的注意力、一致的动作和言语)而进一步增加。这表明，人类的社会和认知能力可以被利用并转移到非人类代理人身上。此外，模仿可以潜在地扩展到人权倡议，互动性可能在增加这一效果方面发挥关键作用。

注：参考中译为机器自动翻译，仅供参考。



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